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Professor Gilda R. Daniels
Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing
Protecting the Right to Vote: Oversight of the Department of Justice’s
Preparations for the 2008 General Election
September 9, 2008
Chairman Leahy, Presiding Chair Senator Cardin and other distinguished
members of the United States Senate Judiciary Committee, it is an honor to
appear before you this afternoon to discuss ways that the Department of Justice
can better prepare for the 2008 Presidential Election.
I have more than a decade of voting rights experience and served as a
Deputy Chief under both the Clinton and Bush administrations. I was a Deputy
Chief in 2000, when the country was crippled with hanging chads, dimpled ballots
and faulty voting machines and worked within the Voting Section to address the
myriad of issues that arose during that election. I served in the Department of
Justice (DOJ), Civil Rights Division, Voting Section as a staff attorney from 1995
to 1998 and a Deputy Chief in that section for six years from 2000 to 2006. I also
served as a staff attorney in the Voting Rights Project of the Lawyers’ Committee
for Civil Rights Under Law for two years. Currently, I am an Assistant Professor
at the University of Baltimore, School of Law, where I teach Election Law among
other topics.
I.

DOJ Presidential Election Experience

In 2000, we witnessed faulty voting machines with hanging chads and
dimpled ballots. We also experienced error-filled purges and voter intimidation in
minority neighborhoods. Since the 2000 Presidential election the voting rights
vocabulary has expanded to include terms such as, “voting irregularities” and
“election protection” and created a new debate regarding voter access versus
voter integrity. Despite the debates and new legislation in the form of the Help
America Vote Act (HAVA),1 and the continued enforcement of other voting
statutes such as the Voting Rights Act2 and the National Voter Registration Act,
(NVRA), problems persist in the operation of our participatory democracy.
1

The Help America Vote Act of 2002 has the stated purpose of with the stated purpose of
“establish[ing] a program to provide funds to States to replace punch card voting systems, to
establish the Election Assistance Commission (EAC) to assist in the administration of federal
elections and to otherwise provide assistance with the administration of certain federal election
laws and programs, to establish minimum election administration standards for States and units
of local government with responsibility for the administration of federal elections, and for other
purposes.” Help America Vote Act (HAVA), Pub. L. No. 107-252, 116 Stat. 1666 (2002); The
HAVA is codified at 42 U.S.C. 15301 to 15545
2
The Voting Rights Act, (VRA), which has been heralded as the most effective piece of
Congressional legislation in our nation’s history, outlawed practices such as literacy tests,
empowered federal registrars to register citizens to vote, and gave the Attorney General the
power to bring widespread litigation instead of the piecemeal approach of the past. As a result,

Although outdated voting machines were not the primary problem in 2004,
the use of electronic voting machines birthed new concerns about accuracy and
reliability, along with questions regarding poll workers’ ability to master the
technology. This election enjoyed its share of election administration problems
such as the misuse of provisional ballots,3 overzealous poll watchers, extremely
long lines, deceptive voter practices, and ill-advised voter purges. In light of the
problems and issues with the last two Presidential elections, it is vitally important
that the Department use the full breadth of its statutory authority to act
proactively to ensure that our democratic process provides every eligible citizen
the opportunity to access the ballot and ensure that the ballot will be counted.
In order to protect the fundamental right to vote, the government must act prior to
Election Day. The Department should initiate contact with both state election
officials and organizations to engage in a significant exchange of information in a
nonpartisan and proactive way.
II.

DOJ Policy and Election Preparation

After the 2000 election and certainly by 2002, the Civil Rights Division,
Voting Section shifted its focus from enforcing the voting rights of minorities
under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA), as evidenced in the lack of cases
brought on behalf of African-Americans, to enforcement of Section 203 for
language minorities, the protection of overseas and military voters under
UOCAVA, HAVA compliance and voter integrity (fraud) issues. In fact, this
administration brought the first case pursuant to Section 2 on behalf of white
voters in Noxubee, MS.4 This lack of enforcement of the Voting Rights Act
would indicate a well documented shift away from enforcement of statutes that
require free and full ballot access to a new emphasis on restricting the ballot in
the name of integrity. This must be corrected.
A.

Election Coverage

Under Section 4 of the VRA, the Attorney General may send federal
observers to any jurisdiction that is required to submit all of its voting changes for
review under Section 5 of the VRA or where provided in a Consent Decree. The
majority of the Voting Section’s preparation relies upon its election coverage,
wide disparities between blacks and whites in voter registration narrowed considerably
throughout the South and the number of African-American elected officials increased
tremendously.
3
The Help America Vote Act requires states to provide provisional ballots, which allow voters
whom election administrators would otherwise deem ineligible for reasons ranging from a lack of
required ID to a voters name not appearing on the list of registered voters, to cast ballots despite
lacking the proper identification or, in some states, attempting to vote in the wrong precinct.
4

In 2005, the DOJ filed suit against the Noxubee County Democratic Executive Committee,
Noxubee County Election Commission and Ike Brown, Chair of the Democratic Executive
Committee in Noxubee, MS. See, United States v. Ike Brown, et.al., 494 F.Supp.2d 440
(S.D.Miss. 2007)

2

which dispatches DOJ personnel under the direction of Voting Section attorneys
to observe Election Day activities and report any irregularities to Voting Section
managers and then work with the jurisdiction to correct those problems. The
Voting Section, however, has limited staff and with the high rate of career
attorney turnover, the level of expertise necessary in the area of election
coverage will require an even higher level of training. Although the Voting
Section dispatched more personnel to observe elections and upgraded its
tracking of Election Day complaints, some of the “election coverage” merely
consisted of an attorney with a cell phone in the US Attorneys’ office. In order to
have a meaningful presence5 that will dissuade attempts to disenfranchise
eligible citizens, the Department should initiate contact with both state election
officials and organizations to engage in a significant exchange of information in a
nonpartisan and proactive way.
Because of the limited number of senior well trained staff, the Voting
Section should provide a separate toll free number to the various Election
Protection programs, in order for them to relay vital information of voting
irregularities or voting rights statute violations to the Voting Section. Additionally,
in preparing for election coverage, the Section should use its pre-election calls to
insure that jurisdictions are prepared. It should also release the list of
jurisdictions where it will provide election observers at least one week prior to
Election Day. It should also limit the recent practice of utilizing the US Attorneys’
offices and the FBI, which are primarily trained in identifying voter fraud.
B.

Election-Related Investigations

After the 2004 election, the Voting Section launched a few election –
related investigations which varied in intensity from phone calls to several visits.
There were purge issues in Georgia; students with id problems in South Carolina,
Illinois and Georgia; intimidation issues in South Carolina and Pennsylvania;
claims of disproportionate voting resources in Florida and Ohio; and National
Voter Registration Act issues in Delaware and Maryland. Most of these issues
could have been addressed prior to Election Day with proper planning and
guidance from DOJ. Many of the calls received or infractions observed on
Election Day did not rise to a legally actionable level. Interestingly enough, the
DOJ received far fewer calls than the estimated 110,000 that Election Protection
groups received; an indication of the level of distrust and lack of confidence in the
Department. After any election, however, no immediate remedy exists for the
mistakenly purged voter or an uncounted provisional ballot, which further
underscores the need for a proactive approach. Disenfranchisement techniques
can create a pattern for a jurisdiction or a political party that should be addressed
and thwarted well before Election Day.

5

A benefit to having a more meaningful presence is the ability to collect data and identify
potential witnesses for future election-related investigations.

3

III.

New Problems: Changes in Election Administration Laws

Since the 2004 Presidential election, the electoral landscape has
changed. New voter identification and voter registration laws have made it more
difficult for citizens to register and vote. Additionally, the use of ill-advised voter
purges and deceptive practices continue to effect voters’ access and ability to
participate in the democratic process. DOJ could and should institutionalize
preventative measures to address both new and recurring election related
issues.6 Based upon my experience, I suggest that the DOJ employ the
following proactive enforcement practices:
A.

Voter ID.

As it pertains to voter id laws, the DOJ needs to monitor those states
where the voter id laws have changed, since the 2004 election. Any change in
rules that affect a voters’ ability to cast a ballot, such as polling place changes,
voter id, etc., can cause voter confusion. Therefore, it is essential that DOJ
communicate with states to make sure that they are in compliance with voting
statutes and that any changes of voting status or location is clearly
communicated to the voter, well before the election.
Many states changed their voter id requirements to comply with the HAVA,
which required that all first time voters who registered by mail without providing id
verifying info must vote in-person and provide an acceptable form of id.7 In 2000,
only eleven states required all voters to show identification. In 2006, the number
doubled to twenty-two states requiring all voters to present some form of id.
Opponents have argued that voter id laws cause an undue burden on poor,
minority, disabled, and elderly citizens and that the expense in obtaining even the
“free” ids are cost prohibitive for many Americans.8 Proponents argue that more
restrictive voter id laws are needed to prevent voter fraud.
The most restrictive requirement was passed in Indiana, which requires all
voters to show a photo id before casting ballots. If the voter lacks a photo id, she
must vote provisionally and subsequently return to the clerk’s office and produce
6

For further discussion on the cumulative effective of new millennium disenfranchising methods,
see, Gilda R. Daniels, A Vote Delayed is a Vote Denied: A Preemptive Approach to Eliminating
Election Administration Legislation that Disenfranchises Unwanted Voters, forthcoming in the
University of Louisville Law Review, November 2008.

7

HAVA requires the following identification: if voting in person, a drivers license or other photo
id, a copy of a current utility bill, bank statement, government check, paycheck, or other
government document that shows the name and address of the voter; or if voting by mail, voter
must submit with the ballot a copy of a current and valid photo identification; or a copy of a
current utility bill, bank statement, government check, paycheck, or other government document
that shows the name and address of the voter.

8

New voter id laws could adversely impact students, who may have a university id, but lack a
photo id with an address within the state.

4

a photo id or sign an indigency affidavit before the vote can be counted. The
Supreme Court recently upheld this law.9 In 2005, Georgia’s passage of a
similar voter id law set off what has been called a “firestorm” of activity in the
media. Georgia is a state covered by Section 5 of the VRA, which requires
specific jurisdictions to submit all voting changes- including but not limited to,
polling place changes and redistricting- to either the United States Attorney
General or the United States District Court for the District of Columbia for
approval.10 Georgia’s submission to the Attorney General and the subsequent
preclearance of the id legislation only fueled the flames. The proposed bill
reduced the acceptable forms of voter identification from seventeen to five: a
driver’s license, a passport, a state or government issued ID, a military ID or a
tribal ID.11
Although federal and state courts, as well as the United States Attorney
General, have found these voter id laws constitutional, opponents continue to
express their concern regarding the impact on those less likely to possess the
requisite identification and their ability to cast a ballot. Thus, DOJ must
correspond with states to determine whether a state ahs alerted its citizens to
election administration changes or plan to include such information in any preelection mailings.
B.

Voter Registration.

Regarding voter registration, the DOJ should contact those states where
problems occurred in 2004, 2006 and during the Presidential primary season to
make certain that jurisdictions are in compliance with voting rights statutes. DOJ
should provide more oversight to ensure that jurisdictions are not rejecting
9

Recently, in Crawford v. Marion County, the Supreme Court found that the Indiana legislature’s
purported rationale for passing the most restrictive voter id law in the country did not violate
constitutional principles.
10
See, 28 C.F.R. Part 51, Section 5 Regulations.
11

The 17 acceptable forms of identification were as follows: valid Georgia driver’s license; valid
identification card issued by a branch, department, agency, or entity of the State of Georgia;
another state, or the United States authorized by law to issue personal identification; valid United
States passport; valid employee identification card containing a photograph of the elector and
issued by any branch, department, agency or entity of the United States government, the State of
Georgia, or any county, municipality, board, authority or other entity of Georgia; valid employee
identification card contain a photograph of the elector issued by any employer of the elector in the
ordinary course of business; valid student identification containing a photograph of the elector
from any public or private college, university, or postgraduate technical or professional school
located within the State of Georgia; valid Georgia license to carry a pistol or revolver; valid pilot’s
license; US military ID; birth certificate; Social security card; certified naturalization
documentation; copy of court records showing adoption, name or sex change; utility bill; bank
statement showing name and address of the elector; government check or payment with name
and address of the elector or other government document showing name and address of the
elector. Ga. Code Ann. §21-2-417.

5

applications that provide sufficient information to determine the eligibility of an
applicant. Further, it should encourage jurisdictions to do more follow-up with
voters if the registration application does not provide enough information to
determine eligibility.
The electoral process requires that states compile lists of eligible and legal
voters. The NVRA requires States to maintain voter registration lists for federal
elections. The NVRA considers applications received or postmarked at least 30
days before a federal election as timely. It also requires that election officials
notify voters that their applications were accepted or rejected. The concern over
voter registration is twofold: 1) the increase in state laws that restrict an
organization’s ability to register citizens (third-party registration) and 2) the
increase in voter registration applications and election administrators’ ability to
process those applications prior to Election Day. Some states, e.g., Ohio,
Florida, and Georgia, have made changes to voter registration procedures that
make it more difficult for third parties, such as the League of Women Voters and
the NAACP, to conduct voter registration drives. Litigation has already
commenced in Ohio, Florida, Georgia and Pennsylvania. The inability of groups
to perform voter registration could effectively diminish the number of eligible
voters, who are able to register.
In 2004, the Department received a high number of calls from persons
who stated that they registered to vote, yet their names were not on the voter
rolls. In many instances, these persons were new registrants and their voter
registration application was not processed. It is hoped that the remarkable
increase in voters for the Presidential primaries alleviated some administrative
processing problems. Therefore, state election officials should ensure that the
counties are processing voter registration applications in a timely manner.
C.

Voter Purges.

Concerning voter purges, DOJ should ensure that purges do not violate
the safeguard provisions of the NVRA. At the same time, the DOJ should not
ignore the primary purpose of the NVRA to establish procedures that will
increase the number of eligible citizens who register to vote in elections for
federal office.
The NVRA requires States to keep accurate and current voter registration
lists, including purging those persons who have died or moved. Before removing
persons or performing list maintenance procedures, the NVRA requires that list
maintenance programs are uniform and non-discriminatory, comply with the
Voting Rights Act, and can not occur 90 days before a federal election. States
may only remove voters after complying with the NVRA’s fail-safe provisions,
which allow for removal of voters from registration lists if they have “been
convicted of a disqualifying crime or adjudged mentally incapacitated,” according

6

to state law.12 The process of removing ineligible voters from state compiled
registered voter lists is called voter purge. Although state governments have
passed legislation that causes specific individuals, such as felons, to be ineligible
voters, voter purge can also cause the removal or invalidation of eligible and
legal voters from voter lists. Florida has been the center of numerous electoral
debates due to the conflicts and controversies that surrounded the 2000
elections. Critics have called the voter purges in Florida during the 2000 election
as “A wildly inaccurate voter purge lists that mistakenly identified 8,000 Floridians
as felons thus ineligible to vote and that listed 2,300 felons, despite the fact that
the state had restored their civil rights.”13
There are various problems surrounding how voter lists are purged.
Approximately, twenty-five percent of the states in an ACLU/Demos survey
reported that they compile purge lists without reference to any legislative
standards. About half of those surveyed purged their voter lists using only an
individual’s name and address, not a one hundred percent match involving full
name and social security number. No state surveyed had codified any specific or
minimum set of criteria for its officials to use in ensuring that an individual with a
felony conviction is the same individual being purged from the voter rolls. Twothirds of the states surveyed do not require elections officials to notify voters
when they purge them from the voter rolls, denying these voters an opportunity to
contest erroneous purges.
Couple this with reports that DOJ threatened to sue ten states to purge
voter rolls before the 2008 presidential election.14 Concerns have been raised
that “the Justice Department's Voting Section is ignoring the primary purpose of
the NVRA to ‘establish procedures that will increase the number of eligible
citizens who register to vote in elections for federal office.’” 15 Instead of carrying
out the primary function of the NVRA to increase voter registration, 16the DOJ’s
Voting Section is concentrating its NVRA enforcement priority on pressuring
12

The NVRA also provides additional safeguards under which registered voters would be able to
vote notwithstanding a change in address in certain circumstances. For example, voters who
move within a district or a precinct will retain the right to vote even if they have not re-registered
at their new address, which is at odds with the way some states administer provisional ballots,
only counting those cast in the proper precinct.
13

Verified Voting Foundation, Open Voter Purge List,
http://www.verifiedvotingfoundation.org/article.php?id=2394 (June 12, 2004)
14

See, New York Times Opinions/Editorial, What Congress Should Do, October 24, 2004Stephen
Roosevelt, Bush Administration Orchestrating Massive Voter Purge Before 2008 Election,
Veteransforcommonsense.org (July 17, 2007).

15

Id.
In a 2008 report for the Maryland Attorney General’s Office, the Task Force on Voting
Irregularities reported than in March 2008 only two persons were registered to vote at its social
services agencies in March 2008. See, Report of the Attorney General’s Task Force on Voting
Irregularities, Maryland Office of the Attorney General, April 29, 2008, p. 12.
16

7

states to conduct massive purges of their voter rolls. Although states need to
maintain accurate voter rolls, the DOJ must remind states that they must comply
with the safeguard requirements in the NVRA. Again, DOJ should not abandon
the mandate of the NVRA to increase voter access to pursue its voter integrity
initiatives.
D.

Voter Deception.

On the topic of voter deception, the DOJ should use the full breadth of its
authority found in 42 U.S.C. 1971(b) and 11(b) of the VRA to thwart deceptive
voter practices. 17
Today, we are seeing a resurgence of deceptive practices, particularly in
African American and immigrant communities. Political parties and operatives
engage in voter deception in an effort to confuse and thwart eligible voters from
participating in the electoral process. These practices are a great cause of concern,
but challenging these actions have been met with some resistance. The Justice
Department has said, after the 2006 federal election that voter deception was
beyond its authority; thus, prompting the initiation of new legislation.
In the 110th Congress, Senators Obama and Schumer introduced the
Deceptive Practices and Voter Intimidation Prevention Act of 2007, which would
criminalize many of the deceptive voter practices and includes penalties of up to
five years in prison for anyone who knowingly “conveys false information with the
intent to keep others from voting.” It increases from one to five years the penalty
for anyone convicted of voter intimidation and requires the Attorney General to
provide accurate election information when deception allegations are proven and
to report to Congress on allegations of deceptions after each federal election. If
passed this bill will fill a loophole for clearly deceptive practices and demonstrate
the need for punishment and enforcement.
Prior to passage of this legislation, however, DOJ could certainly thwart
deceptive practices that rise to the level of intimidation under its Voting Rights Act

17

42 U.S.C. 1971(b) reads as follows:
No person, whether acting under color of law or otherwise, shall intimidate, threaten, coerce, or
attempt to intimidate, threaten, or coerce any other person for the purpose of interfering with
the right of such other person to vote or to vote as he may choose, or of causing such other
person to vote for, or not to vote for, any candidate for the office of President, Vice President,
presidential elector, Member of the Senate, or Member of the House of Representatives,
Delegates or Commissioners from the Territories or possessions, at any general, special, or
primary election held solely or in part for the purpose of selecting or electing any such
candidate.
See also, Section 11(b) of the Voting Rights Act.

8

authority.18 DOJ has authority pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1971(b) to address voter intimidation
and voter deception. The question remains whether it will choose to do so. It could publicize
and utilize a toll free number for the sole purpose of chronicling deceptive practices across the
nation. Once verified, in addition to sending a press release, the DOJ should immediately
coordinate with state agencies and media outlets to correct any misleading information. It
should also begin enforcement actions against perpetrators of deceptive practices.
E.

Poll Watchers.

Regarding poll watchers, the DOJ should send a letter to states and
organizations where this practice was problematic and require the state to fully
comply with Sections 2 and 208 of the Voting Rights Act, which outlaws
discriminatory voting practices or procedures.
Most states allow candidates to designate persons to “watch” the election
process inside the polling place. These poll watchers, however, are not allowed
to interfere with the voting process. In 2004, political candidates and parties
dispatched thousands of attorneys and other individuals to “monitor” the
administration of the election. We saw poll watchers launch an enormous
number of strategic challenges to voters’ eligibility, some based on race and
language ability. Additionally, in some instances, at any given time, polls had
more watchers than workers or actual voters.
In 2004, Republicans in Wisconsin attempted to challenge the
registrations of 5,600 voters in Milwaukee but were turned down in a unanimous
decision by the city's bipartisan election board. In Ohio, Republicans challenged
35,000 voters, after compiling their names through a caging scheme.19 The
people on the list had either refused to sign letters delivered by the Republican
Party or the letters had been returned as undelivered. Voters in Ohio won an
injunction preventing challengers from remaining at voting-stations20

18

In 1992, the DOJ filed and settled United States v. North Carolina Republican Party, C.A. No. 92-161CIV-5-F (E.D. N.C.), which involved the United States Senate election in North Carolina with African
American Harvey Gantt versus incumbent Jesse Helms. In this action, the North Carolina Republican Party
was accused with mailing postcards with misleading information as to voter eligibility, to registered voters prior
to the November 1990 election. The postcards recipients were predominately African American.
19

With one type of caging, a political party sends registered mail to addresses of registered
voters. If the mail is returned as undeliverable - because, for example, the voter refuses to sign
for it, the voter isn't present for delivery, or the voter is homeless - the party uses that fact to
challenge the registration, arguing that because the voter could not be reached at the address,
the registration is fraudulent. A political party challenges the validity of a voter's registration; for
the voter's ballot to be counted, the voter must prove that their registration is valid.
20

Spencer v. Blackwell, 347 F.Supp.2d 528 S.D.Ohio (2004).

9

The Department should send a letter to states and organizations where
this practice was problematic. Outreach, through the form of a letter, to
organizations and state entities, should remind these groups and elected officials
of the voters’ rights and the process the poll watcher and poll worker should
follow. Although the process for designating a poll watcher varies state to state
these laws must comply with Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, which outlaws
discriminatory voting practices or procedures.
F.

Provisional Ballots.

A consequence of excessive voter challenges was the use of provisional
ballots. In some instances, due to misinformation or a lack of poll worker
training, poll workers asked the challenged voter to cast a provisional ballot. In
some states, if a voter cast a provisional ballot in the wrong polling place,
pursuant to state rules, the provisional ballot was not counted.21 DOJ should
make certain that jurisdictions are not administering provisional ballots with a
discriminatory purpose or a discriminatory result.
G.

Disproportionate Allocation of Voting Machines

Today, American citizens are registering to vote at exceptionally high
rates. Minority and young voters are energized and eager to turnout and
participate in what has certainly proven to be one of the most historic election
cycles in our lifetimes. However, these efforts will prove futile if ultimately, these
voters are unable to cast ballots that will count on Election Day. In many urban
locations, voters are subjected to extremely long lines and faulty equipment.
Although we had all hoped that HAVA would eliminate such occurrences, it has
not. Curiously, the extremely long lines and undercounting of voting machines
tend to occur in predominately African American areas. To address this problem
DOJ should coordinate with HAVA’s Election Assistance Commission (EAC) to
determine if certain jurisdictions are “repeat offenders” and bring a Section 2 of
the VRA claim. It could also coordinate with the EAC to establish “best practices”
21

The administration of provisional ballots, however, has been called into question for the myriad
of ways that election administrators determine whether to count the ballot. In 2004, the first year
that HAVA required state’s to provide provisional ballots, nearly 1.9 million of those ballots were
cast and 1.2 million provisional ballots were counted, which left more than half a million people
disenfranchised. See, Election Data Services, Election Day Survey, conducted for the U.S.
Election Assistance Commission, at 6-5 (Sept. 27 2005). Moreover, poll worker confusion and
unavailable ballots accounted for even more disparities. A People for the American Way report
found:
There was widespread confusion over the proper use of provisional ballots, and widely
different regulations from state to state—even from one polling place to the next—as to
the use and ultimate recording of these ballots.
See, People for the American Way et al., Shattering the Myth: An Initial Snapshot of Voter
Disenfranchisement in the 2004 Elections, at 8 (December 2004).
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for determining the number of voting machines per number of registered voters.
Finally, Congress should use its Elections Clause Power and amend HAVA to
mandate the number of voting machines per precinct and interpret HAVA to
provide additional election administration reporting requirements.22
IV.

Conclusion

In my testimony, I have outlined some of the critical problem areas during
the 2004 election cycle and proposed steps that the Justice Department should
take to ensure that these problems are not repeated this November. However, it
is essential that the Department act now.
The DOJ should immediately: 1) send letters to all states outlining federal
voting rights statute requirements regarding voter purges, voter registration,
UOCAVA, etc. with deadlines for action; 2) send letters and conduct calls to
states with “observed” problems that could violate federal voting rights statues,
e.g., lack of adherence to minority language requirements, information on
particularly hostile areas/contests; 3) hold meetings with advocacy groups to
“coordinate” election coverage; 4) provide jurisdictions and advocacy groups with
a list detailing election coverage at least one week prior to the election; and 5)
begin more extensive election coverage training of DOJ staff stressing “voter
access” issues instead of “voter fraud.
On Election Day, DOJ should limit United States Attorney and FBI election
coverage and “coordinate” communication with advocacy groups. DOJ should
renew efforts to coordinate with civil rights and other organizations to discuss
Election Day preparedness and learn how those groups plan to approach various
voting irregularities and share how DOJ will address issues. For future elections,
Congress should: 1) use its Elections Clause Power and amend HAVA to
mandate the number of voting machines per precinct and 2) interpret HAVA to
provide additional election administration reporting requirements.
Finally, Congress should require DOJ to implement a timeline for election
coverage proactive activity. Consequently, the best time to correct for potential
disenfranchising methods is to establish a proactive plan NOW.

22

For further discussion, see, Gilda R. Daniels, A Vote Delayed is a Vote Denied: A Preemptive
Approach to Eliminating Election Administration Legislation that Disenfranchises Unwanted
Voters, forthcoming in the University of Louisville Law Review, November 2008.
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